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,What Personal Rules Can Teach Us 
About Basic Institutions 
CLAIRE FINKELSTEIN* 
Suppose I am an alcoholic who wishes to sober up. Assuming I am 
rational, it should be simple: Because I prefer a sober life to the life of a 
drunk, I have reason to stop drinking. But, as we know, matters are not 
that simple. For here I am at a cocktail party. Although I prefer to be 
dry than to be an alcoholic, I surely prefer to have this one drink than to 
be dry, at least in the moment. If I am rational, therefore, I will have this 
drink. But if I reason this way each time, l will always choose to drink, 
and I will remain an alcoholic. 
What is to be done? Perhaps l could check myself into a sanatorium, 
where I will be physically prevented from drinking, but this has high costs. 
l would need to take a leave of absence from my job; I would be 
separated from friends and family. Much better. I think, to quit on my own. 
So I settle instead on a rule, a rule I will follow in all situations. The 
rule is this: do not drink. NO\v instead of asking myself whether I would 
prefer this drink to momentary sobriety, I will simply consult my 
personal rule. And because my rule says do not drink, perhaps now I 
can take a pass at the party. 
But the problem is this: If it was rational for me to accept that drink 
before, how can it be rational for me to follow a rule that says to 
refrain from drinking? My rule only stands in my way because 
following the rule means refraining from doing something that will 
leave me better off, relative to what l novv prefer. Having a drink 
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now, after alL need not lead to a further drink; it need not lead to 
permanent drunkenness. But once again, if I reason this way, I will 
always choose to drink, and I will end up an alcoholic. 
Perhaps therein lies the answer: If I consistently follow the rule, I will 
be sober. If I do not follow the rule, I will be a drunk. So following the 
rule will benefit me overalL Thus while not taking this drink may be 
suboptimal, from the standpoint of my current preferences, it is part of a 
plan of action that is optimal, compared to the feasible alternatives. 
This. in and of itself, gives me a reason to follow the rule. 
I have suggested that a person who will be benefited by following a 
rule has a reason to follow the rule, a reason that makes his following the 
rule rational. Inherent in my suggestion is a more general, and admittedly 
controversial, claim, namely that an agent has most reason to adopt that 
n10de of reasoning that will benefit him most, even if it commits him to 
actions that, considered separately, leave him worse off, relative to his 
preferences. This claim combines what we might call the "benefit 
principle," namely that it is rational to make choices according to one's 
greatest benefit, with the idea that an agent's mode of reasoning is a 
suitable object of choice. Together they suggest that it is rational to 
select one's mode of reasoning according to one's greatest benefit. Thus 
if following a personal rule conduces to an improvement in one's overall 
welfare, as compared with reasoning case-by-case, the benefit principle 
says that it is rational to reason according to personal rules. Thus it is 
rational to select actions in accordance with a rule that dictates not 
drinking-not because it is maximally rational to completely refrain 
from drinking, but because one can expect to do better by adopting that 
rule and sticking to it than by following any other rule or by reasoning 
case-by-case. 
Notice, crucially, that there is an imp01iant implication of saying that 
the benefit principle supplies me with a reason to follow a rule, namely 
that it is not necessary for me to bar myself from reconsidering a 
personal rule in order to stick to the rule, as other writers in this area 
have thought. I need not cripple myself mentally, in other words, to 
stick to a rule on which I have settled. This is even so when I receive 
new information that might sway me in the direction of abandoning my 
rule. Suppose, for example, I am standing at the cocktail party, conversing 
with a cardiologist who is extolling the benefits to me of moderate 
drinking. I have already settled on my rule of not drinking, and have 
been successful in sticking to it. The cardiologist, however, tells me that 
moderate drinking reduces the risk of heart disease, hea1i attack, and 
stroke better than intense and regular cardiovascular exercise. This 
prompts me to reconsider the merits of my rule. While I prefer sobriety 
to alcoholism, I now prefer moderate drinking to sobriety. Do I now 
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have a reason to abandon my mle and reach for that drink? And will this 
not lead me back to case-by-case reasoning, and so to alcoholism') It 
might be possible for me to revise my mle-to soften it to accommodate 
my new preferences. I might, for example, adopt a mle like "drink only 
at cocktail parties," or "drink exactly one drink a day.'' Such rules, if 
feasible, would be preferable to the more generic rule against drinking. 
But personal mles of this sort are typically nebulous and easily finessed. 
They quickly collapse into case-by-case reasoning. 
It is for this reason that some believers in personal rules also 
recommend a policy of nonreconsideration. Reconsideration, they believe. 
will lead me to side with my preferences and so to abandon my rule. 
Some reconsideration in the face of new information must be pem1itted. 
they allow. But because reconsideration leads to rule abandonment, it 
must be used sparingly. If the benefit principle is cotTect, however, I 
need not side with my immediate preferences when I reconsider. I can 
side instead with what I take myself to have most reason to do, even in 
the face of preferences to the contrary. The point is that it is not 
necessary for me to impair my reflective and deliberative capacities in 
order to follow a rule. 
Notice further that if I did impair my deliberative faculties in order to 
stick to my rule, I arguably would not actually be follmving the rule at 
all. Following a mle is a rational activity, distinguishable from various 
causal methods one might adopt that bypass reason altogether. Thus 1 might 
go to a hypnotist or swallow a pill in order to ensure conformity vvith my 
not drinking mle. But such methods would be causal, not rational. They 
would be a form of internalized precommitment-a psychological version 
of joining a sanatorium. True rule following, however, capitalizes on, 
rather than eschews, rational agency. 
I am interested in the way in which the benefit principle endorses 
adherence to personal mles, among other things, because I think it is of 
potential relevance to law. In particular, I believe it provides us with a 
way of approaching fundamental justificatory questions about basic legal 
institutions. The question we must ask is whether the rules that govern a 
given institution are rationally defensible to each person who must live 
under them, even at moments at which that person would maximize his 
preferences by abandoning the mle. And this is the question of whether 
that institution satisfies the benefit principle for each individual 
contractor whose assent to that institution is required. 
The most straightforward application of the benefit principle is in the 
7! 
area of contract law. It is easy to see that rational contractors are likely 
to favor an institution that forces them to keep contracts, e\·en in cases in 
which they would be advantaged by breaking them, as compared with a 
regime in which contracts were unenforced. The benefit principle, however, 
will also provide us \Vith more specific guidance for institutional rules. 
It might make sense of the much maligned doctrine of consideration, 
since this is a rule that aims to protect mutuality of benefit. And it might 
explain why it is acceptable for cou11s to supply a missing term in a 
contract, provided that they thereby give effect to the parties' actual 
intentions at the time of contracting, since intentions supply a measure 
of the benefits each pany hoped to receive from the contract. 
Can the benefit principle help make sense of legal rules in more far 
flung settings" For example, can it help justify an institution like 
punishment or tell us what punishments are legitimate? The question we 
might ask is whether a rational contractor can regard hin1self as better 
off under the rules of that institution than he would be in their absence. 
To answer that question, we must ask whether a person who was himself 
subject to the rules of the institution would still see himself as faring 
better, even once he had to incur their costs, than he would fare in their 
absence. There is reason to think that in many cases, the test wi 11 be 
satisfied. For the deterrent benefits of many penalties will provide 
individual contractors with greater benefit in the fonn of security against 
the infractions of others than they would lose in welfare by being subject 
to the penalty themselves. 
Suppose, for example, we wanted to know whether to institute life 
sentences for larceny. We \vould compare rhe degree of disadvantage to 
an individual contractor who would suffer that penalty with the degree 
of advantage to that same individual from living in a society with a rule 
protecting private property in rhis \vay. The latter would be a function 
of, first, the marginal deterrent benefits of that penalty relative to nwre 
moderate penalties, and second, the significance of the substantive value 
that penalty was protecting. The nom1s protected by a prohibition on 
larceny are norms of private ownership, and in the absence of any 
punishment for larceny (and like crimes), private ownership would be 
eliminated. Thus each rational contractor should ask himself: Would I 
be better off under the tenns of a contract that established penalties for 
larceny, assuming that I myself may end up subject to that penalty, than 
I would be if there were no private ownership at all? Notice that if the 
penalties for burglary are too low, the deterrent effect will be 
insignificant, and private property will not be protected. If the penalties 
arc too high, however. agents receiving the penalty would be worse off 
than they would have been in the absence of private property altogether, 
and the benefit principle would not be satisfied. The benefit principle, in 
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combination with the rational goal of detenence, thus yields specific 
parameters for the punishment of each separate crime.1 
This last example illustrates a final point about the benefit principle I 
wish to underline. That principle would not uniquely identify the 
institutions that rational agents would adopt. There are many possible 
legal regimes that could satisfy the benefit principle. My suggestion is 
only that rational contracting agents would reject any basic institution 
that failed the benefit test. Satisfying the benefit principle thus provides 
a necessary, but not sufficient condition for basic institutions. What 
additional conditions rational contractors would place on the adoption of 
basic institutions remains to be developed. In the case of punishment, I 
suggested the additional condition of detenent efficacy. Other institutions 
would have other desiderata. My aim has merely been to show that a 
ce1iain way of looking at rational agency can give specific and plausible 
guidance to the task of justifying legal institutions. I shall unfo!1lmately 
have to leave the details for another day. 
1 For a fuller discussion of this approach to punishment see generally Claire 
Finkelstein, A Contractarian Approach to Punishment, in THE BLACKWELL 
GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LA 'vV AND LEGAL THEORY 207 (Martin P. 
Golding & William A. Edmunson eds., 2005). 
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